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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION'S ENHANCED DISCLOSURE
AND NEW PROSPECTUS DELIVERY
OPTION FOR REGISTERED MUTUAL
FUNDS
SARAH B. ZIMMER
INTRODUCTION
"Never invest in a product that you don't fully understand,"
advises the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").' To
ensure that investors make informed decisions, the SEC requires
mutual funds to provide investment information in the form
of a prospectus.2  A mutual fund prospectus is a lengthy,
comprehensive document that describes in detail a fund's goals,
fees, expenses, investment strategies, and risks.3  The SEC
expects a mutual fund's prospectus to be an investor's primary
source of information.4 It is no secret, however, that investors
find mutual fund prospectuses to be cumbersome and difficult to
understand.
Prospectuses have long been criticized for being overly
legalistic and containing too much information. At the root of
the problem is the tension that results from the prospectus
functioning both as a document used to inform investors and as a
document used to protect mutual fund companies from liability.
Recognizing the inherent drawbacks of the prospectus as a
user-friendly document, the SEC has recently adopted rules to
' Notes and Comments Editor, St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2010, St.
John's University School of Law; B.S., 2004, Syracuse University. The author thanks
Professors Lazaro and Catalano for their help and guidance.
1 SEC, Invest Wisely: Advice from Your Securities Industry Regulators (Aug. 1,
2007), http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inws.htm.
2 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING MUTUAL
FUNDS 21 (2007), http://www.ici.org/pdf/bro-understanding-mfs p.pdf.
3Id.
' See Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment
Companies, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,898, 10,900 (proposed Mar. 10, 1997) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239, 270, 274).
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enhance the accessibility of the disclosures provided to mutual
fund investors in the prospectus.5 The newly adopted rule grants
mutual funds the option to satisfy prospectus delivery obligations
under section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities
Act")6 by providing investors with a summary of key information
(a "summary prospectus") while posting additional information-
including the statutory prospectus-on the Internet.' The
summary prospectus is a streamlined disclosure document that
contains key investment information in plain English, and in a
standardized order., All mutual fund companies will be required
to replace the current Risk/Return Summary located at the
beginning of the statutory prospectus with the newly adopted
summary prospectus. 9  If funds choose to disseminate the
summary prospectus as a stand-alone, preliminary disclosure
document, the statutory prospectus must be made available on
funds' websites and sent to investors upon their request.1"
"With virtually every other household in the United States
invested in mutual funds, effective and efficient regulation of the
mutual fund industry must be a top national priority."" The
SEC uses consumer investment in mutual funds as a measure of
investor confidence. 12 Investor confidence is vital to the health of
the nation's capital markets and without it, consumers will flee
the market. 3 Moreover, mutual funds represent the country's
primary investment vehicle, and with over 8,000 funds to choose
from, investors face the difficult task of choosing a fund that
satisfies their personal investment goals.' 4  Smart investing
Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered
Open-End Management Investment Companies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4546 (Jan. 26, 2009)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 274) [hereinafter Enhanced Disclosure
Rule].
15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2006).
Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4546.
See id. at 4548.
9Id.
10 Id. A "statutory prospectus" is a prospectus that meets the requirements of
section 10(a) of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77j(a).
"' Donna M. Nagy, Regulating the Mutual Fund Industry, 1 BROOK. J. CORP.
FIN. & COM. L. 11, 44 (2006).
2 Barbara Black, Are Retail Investors Better Off Today?, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 303, 304-05 (2008).
13 Id. at 304.
14 See INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY
FACT BOOK 114-15 tbl.5 (49th ed. 2009), available at http://www.icifactbook.org
[hereinafter INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK]. These goals include providing for
1432 [Vol. 83:1431
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requires consumers to believe that they hold the proper tools to
make sound investment choices.15 Investors, however, cannot
make sound investment decisions unless they have accurate,
useful information presented in a clear manner. The statutory
prospectus in its current form does not sufficiently provide
ordinary investors with the ability to make these critical
investment decisions. If investors are not supplied with
adequate information to assess the risks of their investments, the
results can be financially catastrophic.1"
The SEC is optimistic that its new rule "has the potential to
revolutionize the provision of information to the millions of
investors who rely on mutual funds for their most basic financial
needs."17  While the SEC should be applauded for taking the
initiative to ensure that investors receive the right information
before investing in mutual funds, the final rule could benefit
from further refinement and specification. In the context of
examining the SEC's final rule, this Note will highlight the
tension that is created as a result of the dual function that a
statutory prospectus currently serves: first, as a document that is
intended to be informative and useful to the average investor;
and second, as a document that is written to protect investment
companies against liabilities imposed by the Securities Act of
1933 for misstatements or omissions. 8  Only one of these
functions is consistent with Congress's intent in passing the
Investment Company Act of 1940 ("1940 Act")9-to instill
investor confidence in mutual fund companies while protecting
the public from the dangers of insufficient regulation of this new
type of security.
retirement, education, and other everyday financial needs. See Black, supra note 12,
at 305.
15 Black, supra note 12, at 306.
" One only needs to look at today's financial crisis to see what can occur when
risk is not properly assessed. Investors can lose their homes, savings, and,
ultimately, their financial security.
17 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4577.
18 CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH ET AL., MUTUAL FUND REGULATION § 4:2.2 (Clifford E.
Kirsch ed., 2d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2009); Shefali Anand, It May Finally Hit the Market:
A Prospectus You Can Read, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2008, at R1 ("A thick prospectus
typically is a fund company's first line of defense against litigation by investors who
lose money; fund companies can point to risk factors and other details listed deep
within.").
19 Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 841 (1940); KIRSCH ETAL., supra note 18, § 1:1.
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This Note suggests that facilitating a user-friendly approach
to investing is preferable to the current disclosure regime.
However, the SEC's plan does not go far enough. The SEC is
sending a mixed message to investors by permitting mutual
funds to utilize the summary prospectus as a disclosure piece
while simultaneously requiring funds to produce a statutory
prospectus. Providing investors with a summary prospectus
while encouraging them to seek out additional information via
the statutory prospectus does not provide investors with a
streamlined approach to investing. This ultimately leads one to
question whether the layered approach is really a meaningful
improvement.
Part I of this Note provides a brief synopsis of mutual funds
and the relevant bodies of regulation. It also offers a general
overview of the SEC's enhanced disclosure and new delivery
option requirements. Part II discusses the current regime of
mutual fund disclosure and examines key aspects of the new
rule, focusing on how the SEC intends to improve the current
scheme of regulation. After each corresponding discussion of the
newly adopted rule, this Note explores the pros and cons of the
SEC's initiative utilizing the comment letters solicited by the
SEC. Part III of this Note assesses the effectiveness of the SEC's
rule in light of what is known about investor behavior and how
investors are treated in New York when they bring a claim
against their broker for fraud or misrepresentation. Part III also
examines the policy considerations that underlie the rules and
the regulatory environment of disclosure.
I. BACKGROUND
The first mutual fund was founded in Boston in 1924, and
today, mutual funds comprise an astonishing thirteen trillion
dollar industry.2° The rise in popularity of mutual funds was a
result of their ability to offer affordable, expert management,
along with the capability to attain diversification with less money
than is needed to diversify through individual ownership of
20 INV STMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 14, at 171, 185 app. C.
1434 [Vol. 83:1431
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securities.21 With nearly half of Americans invested in mutual
funds-far more than those who own individual stocks and
bonds-this market is prime for thorough regulation.22
A mutual fund is an investment company that pools money
from many investors and purchases a portfolio of securities
selected by an investment adviser to meet a specified investment
goal.23 Functionally, a mutual fund company is "a shell, a pool of
assets consisting of securities, belonging to the shareholders of
the fund. 24 Investors purchase shares of the mutual fund from
the fund itself or through a broker rather than from other
investors on secondary markets such as the New York Stock
Exchange.25 There are three basic types of mutual funds: open-
end, closed-end, and unit investment trusts. This Note, however,
only covers open-end mutual funds-that is, those that
continuously issue new shares.26
Four principal securities laws govern mutual funds: the
Securities Act of 1933,27 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,28
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,29 and the 1940 Investment
Company Act.3" These federal securities acts were enacted to
21 See Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and
Stock Market Volatility-What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange
Commission Is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 914 (2005).
22 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 14, at 72.
2 SEC, Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds (July 2, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm [hereinafter Invest Wisely].
24 Zell v. Intercapital Income Sec., Inc., 675 F.2d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1982).
29 Invest Wisely, supra note 23.
26 Id. Closed-end funds are similar to individual stocks; a fixed number of shares
are sold at one time in an initial public offering, and those shares then trade on the
secondary markets. Id. Unit investment trusts ("UIT") also make a "one-time public
offering of ... a specific, fixed number of redeemable securities." Id. Those securities
are referred to as "units" and will expire on a date specified when the UIT was
created. Id.
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006).
8 See id. § 78a.
2 See id. § 80b-1.
See id. § 80a-1. Additionally, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
("FINRA") plays a role in regulating mutual funds. Nagy, supra note 11, at 16.
Created in July 2007 by the merger of the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") and the regulatory arm of the New York Stock Exchange, FINRA is the
principal regulator of broker-dealers in the United States. See About the Financial
Industry Regulatory Authority, http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/index.htm (last
visited Mar. 24, 2010). Broker-dealers who sell mutual funds must comply with
FINRA's regulations concerning advertising and sales practices, and they are subject
to periodic inspections by FINRA. Nagy, supra note 11, at 16. Broker-dealers who
143520091
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avoid the dangers of the "caveat emptor philosophy" by
implementing a "philosophy of full disclosure. ' 31 The acts most
relevant to mutual fund disclosure are the Securities Act and the
1940 Act. The Securities Act, enacted after the stock market
crash of 1929 and the subsequent depression, had two objectives:
first, to ensure that investors receive considerable information
regarding publicly offered securities; and second, to prohibit
misrepresentation and fraud in the sale of securities.32 The
Securities Act also outlines the registration process for
securities.33 As mutual funds continuously offer and sell their
shares to the public, they must comply with the Securities Act
registration requirements. 4 Accordingly, mutual funds must
register a public offering of their shares pursuant to the
Securities Act. 5
The 1940 Act, a complex statutory scheme that governs
investment companies and the mutual fund industry, was
Congress's response to the mismanagement and fraud that
plagued the industry in the 1930s and caused investors to lose
more than one billion dollars. 36  The SEC played a role in
drafting the 1940 Act and sought to instill consumer confidence
in the mutual fund industry by providing the public with
enhanced protection.37  The Act expressly sets forth the
requirements with which SEC-registered funds must comply, and
the SEC is responsible for ensuring funds' compliance with those
rules and regulations. 3' For example, the Act mandates that
mutual funds register with the SEC and may not engage in any
business in interstate commerce or use the mails to offer any
security for sale until the fund is properly registered.39 In
violate FINRA regulations or federal securities laws may face disciplinary action by
FINRA. Id.
" See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
32 See KIRSCH ETAL., supra note 18, § 1:1.
Id. § 4:1.2.
34 Id.
" See id.
16 H. Norman Knickle, The Investment Company Act of 1940: SEC Enforcement
and Private Actions, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 777, 780-81, 784 (2004).
17 See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter & Ahmed E. Taha, Mutual Fund Investors:
Divergent Profiles, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 934, 957 (2008) (stating that the
underlying premise of the 1940 Act was that "investors cannot fend for themselves"):
see also Nagy, supra note 11, at 15-16.
18 KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, at § 4:1.1; Nagy, supra note 11, at 16.
'9 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7 (2006).
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addition to setting forth extensive disclosure requirements,40 the
Act also regulates substantive aspects of mutual funds'
organization and structure.41
Finally, the offer and sale of securities by mutual funds is
also subject to state securities laws-often referred to as blue sky
laws-which require securities to be registered in the state in
which they are offered for sale.42 For a fund that is widely
distributed, this requires separate registration in all fifty
states. 43  The state registration process "lends itself to an
automated and clerical approach" and is, therefore, typically
handled by a fund's administrative staff.
44
A. General Overview of Prospectus Requirements Prior to the
Enactment of the New Rule: Content and Delivery
Mutual fund prospectus disclosures are made in the context
of fund registration under both the Securities Act and the 1940
Act.45  Form N-1A is the designated registration statement form
for mutual funds that satisfies both the Securities Act and the
1940 Act.4" "The purpose of the prospectus is to provide essential
information about the Fund in a way that will help investors
make informed decisions about whether to purchase the Fund's
shares described in the prospectus."47 The information required
40 Id. § 80a-29 (outlining the requirements for filing periodic reports with the
SEC and disseminating reports to investors).
" See id. § 80a-18(i) (relating to "capital structure of investment companies");
see also id. § 80a-25 (pertaining to the filing of reorganization plans for registered
investment companies); id. § 80a-14 (establishing guidelines for the size of
registered investment companies and requiring that such companies have net
worths of at least $100,000 before making a public offering of securities); id. § 80a-19
(establishing guidelines for the payment or distribution of dividends).
42 KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, § 4:1.4.
43 Id.
44 Id.
41 Id. § 4:1.
46 Id. § 4:1.2.
'" Id. § 4:3.2. Form N-1A provides guidelines for mutual funds for registering
and creating a prospectus:
The prospectus disclosure requirements in Form N-1A are intended to elicit
information for an average or typical investor who may not be sophisticated
in legal or financial matters. The prospectus should help investors to
evaluate the risks of an investment and to decide whether to invest in a
Fund by providing a balanced disclosure of positive and negative factors.
Disclosure in the prospectus should be designed to assist an investor in
comparing and contrasting the Fund with other funds.
14372009]
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by Form N-1A must be provided "in a clear, concise and
understandable manner" pursuant to the plain English
requirements of rule 421 promulgated under the Securities Act.4"
This rule was adopted in 1998 to address concerns that fund
disclosure documents were difficult for investors to understand.4 9
Form N-1A is divided into three parts.5" Part A includes
information required by section 10(a) of the Securities Act.5' This
consists of the Risk/Return Summary, which covers investments,
risks, performance, and fees.52 Additionally, a fund's investment
objectives, principal investment strategy, related risks, and a
disclosure of the portfolio holdings are detailed in this section.53
Generally, a fund has little discretion in formulating Part A
of a prospectus since Form N-1A explicitly lists the required
information and in what order it must appear.54 Part B includes
the information required in a fund's Statement of Additional
Information ("SAI").55 The purpose of the SAI is to provide
supplementary information about the particular fund that
the SEC believes "is not necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors to be in the
prospectus, but that some investors may find useful." 6  The
SAI is comprised of information such as the fund's history,
SEC, REGISTRATION FORM FOR OPEN-END MANAGEMENT INVESTMENT COMPANIES 6
(2009), available at http://sec.gov/about/forms/formn- la.pdf.
's 17 C.F.R. § 230.421 (2009). This rule requires that information in a fund's
prospectus must comply with four general standards: "(1) ... [w]henever possible,
use short, explanatory sentences and bullet lists; (2) [u]se descriptive headings and
subheadings; (3) [a]void frequent reliance on glossaries or defined terms as the
primary means of explaining information... ; (4) [a]void legal and highly technical
business terminology." Id.
49 KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, § 4:2.2. Investors had difficulty understanding
the documents because they were "written by lawyers primarily as documents to
avoid potential fund liability under the securities laws, rather than to communicate
clearly with the public." Id.
5 It is no wonder that mutual fund prospectuses are so long when the
registration form alone is comprised of sixty-five pages.
5 See SEC, supra note 47, at 6.
-5 See id. at 10, 13.
7' Id. at 18.
51 Id. at 9-26.
5 KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, § 4:3.
, SEC, supra note 47, at 6.
1438 [Vol. 83:1431
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management of the fund, portfolio managers, and taxation of the
fund.57 Finally, Part C contains "Other Information," including
location of accounts and records, principal underwriters, and
indemnification.58
Despite these extensive disclosure requirements-prior to
the enactment of the SEC's rule-a fund's prospectus disclosed
very little information regarding costs.59  Costs, including
ongoing yearly fees and transaction fees, can vary drastically
from fund to fund, and investors understand very little with
respect to how costs affect their investment portfolios.60 It has
been suggested that broker-dealers inadequately educate
investors with respect to investing in funds, especially when it
comes to costs. 61 In addition, mutual funds often give incentives
to broker-dealers as rewards for selling shares of their funds,
resulting in potential conflicts of interest.62 In this type of
environment, one must wonder if retail investors are being
treated fairly.63  If investors cannot efficiently gather key
information from a fund's prospectus or from broker-dealers, they
face a very difficult task in choosing among thousands of
available mutual funds.
Once the prospectus has been finalized and approved by the
SEC, it must be delivered to each purchaser of a fund's shares by
no later than the time the investor has received confirmation of
his or her initial purchase. 64 The federal securities laws do not
prescribe a specific medium by which the prospectus must be
provided to purchasers. 65 The SEC has indicated that delivery
may be satisfied by electronic means.6   Electronic delivery,
however, is not valid without the purchaser's prior consent to
this method of delivery. 7
7 Id. at 27, 29, 39, 43.
. Id. at 56-58.
9 See Black, supra note 12, at 325-26.
'0 See id.
61 Id. at 326.
62 Id. at 325.
63 Id.
4 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2006); KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, § 4:7.2.
t KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, § 4:8.
66 Id.
67 Id. § 4:8.1.
14392009]
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The registration process, particularly the requirements of
Form N-1A, fuels the tension between creating a useful document
for investors while shielding funds from liability imposed by the
Securities Act. Investment companies have become accustomed
to disclosing to consumers too much information-to protect
themselves from liability-without carefully considering the
drawbacks of this practice.68 Former SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt said, "[t]oo much information can be as much a problem as
too little" and "[more disclosure does not always mean better
disclosure." 9  When investors are provided with too much
information, they become overwhelmed, hindering their ability to
make informed choices. This defeats the very purpose disclosure
was intended to serve-to protect and inform investors.7"
II. SEC's ENHANCED DISCLOSURE AND NEW DELIVERY OPTION
SCHEME
Since investment in mutual funds gained momentum in the
1980s, the SEC has devoted significant attention to improving
disclosure. In 1983, the SEC adopted a "two-part disclosure
format" under which investors first receive the statutory
prospectus, which provides them with essential information,
then, upon request, receive the more detailed information in the
form of the SAL.71 Additionally, Levitt began work on improving
mutual fund disclosure in 1994 when he initiated a program to
develop an efficient mutual fund disclosure document known as
the "Profile Prospectus."72 Then, in 1998, the SEC adopted a rule
allowing mutual funds to sell shares via a "fund profile," which
" See Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure
Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR
L. REV. 139, 146-47 (2006).
" Id. at 162 (quoting Arthur Levitt, Corporate Finance in the Information Age,
INSIGHTS, Mar. 1997, at 19).
70 Id.
71 Registration Form Used by Open-End Management Investment Companies,
62 Fed. Reg. 10,898, 10,899 (Mar. 10, 1997) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239,
270, 274); Letter from David Certner, Legislative Counsel and Director of Legislative
Policy, AARP, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Feb. 28,
2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-114.pdf.
72 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, INVESTOR VIEWS ON THE U.S. SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION'S PROPOSED SUMMARY PROSPECTUS 1 (2008),
http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr-08 sum mary prospectus.pdf.
1440 [Vol. 83:1431
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was not widely adopted by funds.7" The SEC claims that the
"fund profile" failed to catch on because it did not enable funds to
incorporate information by reference, and thus funds had "little
incentive to use it. 74
The SEC's most recent attempt to improve the disclosure
regime is the summary prospectus. In November 2007, the SEC
released a proposal to amend Form N-1A and to adopt a new
rule permitting mutual funds to satisfy prospectus delivery
requirements by sending a summary prospectus to investors.73
One year later, the SEC voted unanimously to adopt these
amendments, with a number of modifications, to take effect
beginning March 31, 2009.76 The SEC claims that this improved
mutual fund disclosure framework will provide investors with
information that is easier to use and more readily available,
while retaining the substance of the information that is currently
offered.7 Furthermore, "[t]he new rule is intended to create a
disclosure regime that is tailored to the unique needs of mutual
fund investors in a manner that provides ready access to the
information that investors need, want, and choose to review in
connection with a mutual fund purchase decision."78
" Id.; see also New Disclosure Option for Open-End Management Investment
Companies, SEC Release Nos. 33-7513, 63 Fed. Reg. 13,968, 13,968 (Mar. 23, 1998)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 270).
" Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Speech by Sec. & Exch. Comm'n
Commissioner: Statement Regarding the Adoption of the Summary Prospectus Rules
(Nov. 19, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.sec. gov/news/speech/2008/
spchl11908tap.htm). Other theories explaining why this initiative failed include
rapid development of the Internet and mutual fund companies' concern about legal
liability. See Anand, supra note 18; Certner, supra note 71, at 2. It has been
suggested that the streamlined prospectus is back because of increased Internet
usage. Anand, supra note 18. With research showing that nearly eighty percent of
fund investors use the Internet, the push for readily available information has
gained significant momentum in recent years. Id.
Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered
Open-End Management Investment Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 67,790 (Nov. 21, 2007)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 232, 239, 274) [hereinafter Proposal].
" Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Improves
Disclosure for Mutual Fund Investors (Nov. 19, 2008), http://sec.gov/news/press/
2008/2008-275.htm. The final version of the proposal contains amendments to rules
159A, 482, 485, 497, and 498 under the Securities Act of 1933 and rules 304 and 401
of Regulation S-T. Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4546. All initial
registration statements on Form N-lA filed on or after January 1, 2010, must
comply with the new rule; this provides mutual funds with a sufficient transition
period following the effective date. Id. at 4574.
" See Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4549.
71 Id. at 4560.
20091 1441
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The SEC's new rule creates a distinct layered approach to
disclosure whereby investors are given key information up front
and later provided with more detailed information upon
request.7 9 The foundation of the initiative is the user-friendly,
streamlined summary prospectus.8 ° Every prospectus will be
required to incorporate a summary section at the beginning of
the document."1 It is important to note that at this time, mutual
funds will not be required to create a separate summary
prospectus; however, they must include the summary section in
the beginning of the statutory prospectus.82  The summary
section will contain information identified by the SEC as central
to making an investment decision. If a fund chooses to rely on a
summary prospectus to meet its Securities Act prospectus
delivery obligations, the amendments provide that the fund's
current statutory prospectus, SAI, and most recent annual and
semi-annual reports must be made available, free of charge, at a
web address specified in the summary prospectus.84 Moreover,
mutual funds may satisfy delivery obligations under the
Securities Act by sending "key information" to investors via a
summary prospectus.8 5 In theory, the summary prospectus is to
be supported by the statutory prospectus, which must be
available online and sent to investors upon their request.8 6
A. Summary Prospectus: Content and Format
The SEC received approximately 160 comment letters on the
enhanced disclosure and new prospectus delivery option
proposal.8 In the following Sections, particular areas of the rule
that garnered significant criticism during the proposal stage are
Id.
Id. at 4546.
Id. at 4549.
& See id. A summary prospectus meeting the requirements of the proposed rule
would be deemed a prospectus under section 10(b) of the Securities Act and section
24(g) of the 1940 Act for the purposes of section 5(b)(1) of the Securities Act. Id. at
4563.
s3 Id. at 4546.
84 See KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, § 4:5.
85 Id.
" See Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4548.
" See SEC, Comments on Proposed Rule: Enhanced Disclosure and New
Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-End Management Investment
Companies, http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807.shtml (last visited Mar. 24,
2010).
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highlighted, followed by a discussion of the pros and cons of those
items as included in the final version. The substance of the
comment letters is used in this discussion. These critiques are
organized into two areas: the format and content of the summary
prospectus and the rule's approach to delivery and the Internet.
The amendments to Form N-1A will alter the beginning
section of the statutory prospectus in two significant ways. First,
the rule requires that additional information be included as a
summary section, intended to function as a comprehensive
presentation of information. 8 Second, for prospectuses that
cover multiple funds, summary information for each fund must
be separately presented to enable investors to compare and
contrast funds.89 The SEC has made one exception to this rule.9"
In order to eliminate information that is duplicative and reduce
the length of prospectuses, the SEC will permit integration of
information that is uniform for multiple funds. 1  Thus, a
prospectus covering multiple funds will be permitted to integrate
information pertaining to the purchase and sale of fund shares,
tax information, and financial intermediary compensation if it is
the same for all funds covered by the prospectus.92
The summary prospectus builds on the old Risk/Return
Summary, which was identified by the SEC as an effective way to
convey key information to consumers.93 The summary prospectus
must contain the following information in this precise order:
"(1) [i]nvestment objectives; (2) costs; (3) principal investment
strategies, risks, and performance; (4) investment advisers
and portfolio managers; (5) brief purchase and sale and tax
information; and (6) financial intermediary compensation. '" 94 If
See Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4549.
s Id. The basis for this requirement is the SEC's belief that "[m]ultiple fund
prospectuses contribute substantially to prospectus length and complexity, which act
as barriers to understanding. [The SEC has] concluded that requiring a self-
contained summary section for each fund will significantly aid investors' ability to
use multiple fund prospectuses effectively." Id. at 4549 n.35.
9' Id. at 4550.
91 Id. at 4550-51.
92 Id.
" Proposal, supra note 75, at 67,792.
9' Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4552. The current version of Form
N-1A was adopted in 1998. Part A contains the items that must be included in a
prospectus to meet the requirements of the Securities Act. Those items include
investment objectives, investment strategies and risks, performance information,
and a fee table. KIRSCH ET AL., supra note 18, § 4:3.1. Other than this required
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a fund relies on rule 4989' to meet its statutory prospectus
delivery obligations, the information contained in the summary
prospectus must be the same information as contained in the
summary section of a fund's statutory prospectus. 9
Mutual fund companies will also be prohibited from
including any additional information in the summary prospectus
not specifically required in the amended General Instructions to
Form N-1A.9 ' The key summary information must be presented,
in plain English, in a standardized order, in approximately three
to four pages.9s
Additionally, the SEC has adopted, as proposed, a cover
page to appear at the beginning of the summary prospectus
that provides the following information: the fund's name and
share classes covered by the summary prospectus; the exchange
ticker symbol of the fund's securities; a statement informing
investors that the document is a summary prospectus; and the
approximate date of the summary prospectus's first use.9 9 The
cover page will also include a legend informing investors that
they may want to review the fund's statutory prospectus before
investing.' 0 This legend also tells investors how and where they
can obtain a copy of the fund's statutory prospectus.0 1
One noteworthy modification to the contents of the summary
prospectus is the SEC's placement of cost information, including
the fee table, in a more prominent position in order to alert
information, a mutual fund may currently organize its prospectus in any manner
that will be "easy for investors to understand." Id.
17 C.F.R. § 230.498 (2009). Rule 498, adopted in 1998, permitted mutual
funds to create a mutual fund profile, which summarized key fund information.
Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4560 n.194. The final rule effectively
eliminates the use of the profile. Id.
16 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4563.
17 See id. at 4551. Funds will still be permitted to include additional information
that is not required in the prospectus. Id.
98 Id. at 4548. The indication of three to four pages is merely a guideline as no
precise number has been designated.
Id. at 4564.
Io d. The legend reads:
Before you invest, you may want to review the Fund's prospectus, which
contains more information about the Fund and its risks. You can find the
Fund's prospectus and other information about the Fund online at
[- -_]. You can also get this information at no cost by calling [_ _]
or by sending an e-mail request to [_ _.
1(1 Id.
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investors to its importance. 10 2  Through its research, the SEC
found that investors are not aware that they pay ongoing costs
each year they are invested in a fund. 1° ' To address this concern,
the SEC has revised the parenthetical following the heading,
"Annual Fund Operating Expenses" to read "expenses that you
pay each year as a percentage of the value of your investment"
rather than "expenses that are deducted from Fund assets. 10 4
The SEC is confident that this revision makes clear to investors
that they pay fund operating expenses as a percentage of the
total value of their fund investment.
10 5
Another improvement in the area of costs is the adoption of a
narrative disclosure alerting investors to the availability of
discounts on front-end sales charges for larger purchases, also
known as "breakpoint discounts."' '  The SEC believes that
investors are not fully aware of the availability of these
discounts, and thus has proposed a brief narrative disclosure to
make this information more prominent and understandable.1 7
Additionally, the rule requires the inclusion of a brief disclosure
concerning portfolio turnover and its effects on transaction
costs.'08 Directly following the fee table, mutual funds will be
required to report their turnover rates for the previous fiscal
year. ' 9 This information must be followed by an explanation of
102 Id. at 4553. For example, a one percent increase in annual fees can reduce an
investor's return by eighteen percent over a twenty-year period. Id. at 4553 n.87.
103 Id. at 4554.
104 Id. at 4553-54 (internal quotation marks omitted).
105 Id. at 4554.
106 Id. at 4553 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 See id. The narrative reads:
You may qualify for sales charge discounts if you and your family invest, or
agree to invest in the future, at least $L in [name of fund family] funds.
More information about these and other discounts is available from your
financial professional and in [identify section heading and page number] of
the Fund's prospectus and [identify section heading and page number] of
the Fund's statement of additional information.
Id. at 4590.
108 Id. at 4554; SEC, Mutual Fund Investing: Look at More than a Fund's Past
Performance, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/mfperform.htm (last visited Mar. 24,
2010) (revealing that a fund that frequently buys and sells securities may also
generate higher capital gains taxes).
109 Id.
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the effect of portfolio turnover on costs and performance."[1 The
explanation also addresses the adverse tax consequences that
may result from high turnover rates in taxable accounts.11'
Another significant item to be included in the summary
section is entitled, "financial intermediary compensation."'12
This item is new to prospectuses and will force mutual funds to
disclose compensation agreements with selling broker-dealers.113
This information is intended to alert investors about potential
conflicts of interest that may arise as a result of broker-dealers
being influenced by compensation arrangements to suggest one
fund over another. 1 4  Compensation relationships have the
potential to affect the objectivity of advice given to investors from
their financial intermediaries." 5  To satisfy the concerns of
commentators about the negative connotation associated with the
blanket disclosure, the SEC modified its original proposal to
allow funds to omit the disclosure if they do not pay financial
intermediaries for the sale of fund shares or any related
services. 116
Finally, the SEC initially proposed requiring funds to
include a list of their top ten holdings in the summary section but
did not include this requirement in the adopted rule, finding the
component had "limited utility."'' 7 During the comment process,
it was pointed out that the top ten holdings information had the
potential to mislead investors because it may not accurately
reflect a fund's overall holdings and may be stale by the time it
reaches investors.18  Similarly, the SEC did not include the
110 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. at 4552.
" ' Id. at 4557. The summary section would conclude with the following
statement:
If you purchase the Fund through a broker-dealer or other financial
intermediary (such as a bank), the Fund and its related companies may pay
the intermediary for the sale of Fund shares and related services. These
payments may create a conflict of interest by influencing the broker-dealer
or other intermediary and your salesperson to recommend the Fund over
another investment. Ask your salesperson or visit your financial
intermediary's Web site for more information.
!d.
'114 Id.
... See Black, supra note 14, at 331-32.
116 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4557.
"I Id. at 4552.
118 Id.
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proposed quarterly performance update in the final rule because
it was concerned that this information may confuse investors and
discourage funds from using the summary prospectus.11 9
Requiring quarterly updating of performance in the summary
prospectus could be potentially confusing to investors because the
summary prospectus would be updated more frequently than the
statutory prospectus; thus investors may be exposed to differing
performance data.12
B. Critique of Format and Content
The organization and substance of the summary prospectus
outlined above received a significant number of critiques, both
positive and negative, during the rule's proposal stages. As to
the organization of the summary prospectus, commentators
generally supported a standardized format to assist investors in
side-by-side comparison of funds. Some argued, however, that
the rule's format requirements are too rigid and could benefit
from greater flexibility. 2' AARP, a staunch supporter of user-
friendly disclosure, suggested that the SEC broaden its
parameters for compliance with the format and presentation of
the summary prospectus.'22 AARP suggested that mutual funds
should be allowed to "use their creativity in designing a form that
is truly investor friendly."12' Ultimately, the SEC retained the
strict organization format, noting that "[flunds have complete
flexibility to prepare and present comparative information to
investors" in advertising and sales material. 12 4
The rule, as adopted, also includes requirements as to
language, typography, style of graphs, and length. Many
commentators believed that such aspects, especially length,
119 Id. at 4565.
120 Id.
121 Letter from Jill Gross, Director, & Jay Yamamoto, Student Intern, John Jay
Legal Servs., Inc., Investor Rights Clinic at Pace Univ. Sch. of Law, to Nancy M.
Morris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 28, 2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-
28-07/s72807-83.pdf ("[I]nstead of imposing a rigid page limit, prohibiting the scope
of information and imposing formatting requirements may be more effective for
funds to provide a concise summary.").
122 Certner, supra note 71, at 1-4.
123 Id. at 4. AARP encouraged the SEC to make use of what mutual funds have
created and use today on their own websites and on Morningstar and Yahoo!
Finance as those sites do an excellent job of presenting information in a user-
friendly format. Id.
124 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4550.
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should be left to the mutual funds to decide. 5 The Assistant
General Counsel of Janus Capital, a publicly owned asset
management company, opined that a precise limitation on the
number of pages in the summary prospectus was not
necessary. 12 6 She argued that the SEC could accomplish its goal
of providing streamlined disclosure by identifying the
information that it considers important to investors without
limiting the number of pages.127 Janus's comment letter stated
"that useful information should not be sacrificed for the sake of
brevity.""12 Another commentator, however, cautioned the SEC
that without a strict page limit, the summary prospectus will
expand over time, undermining its utility.'29 The SEC ultimately
decided to leave the page limit open though it suggested that the
summary prospectus should be approximately three to four pages
in length. 130
Commentators also disagreed as to whether the summary
prospectus should be consistent for all funds or if the SEC should
allow exceptions for greater flexibility for certain types of
funds.' 3 ' Representatives from EQ Advisors Trust and AXA
2-5 Letter from Michael P. Zimmer, President, Fluent Techs., to Nancy M.
Morris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 14, 2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-
28-07/s72807-128.pdf ("This will encourage creativity, improve the industry's
adoption rate for the new document and further support the intent of the
regulation.").
12' Letter from Stephanie Grauerholz-Lofton, Vice President and Assistant Gen.
Counsel, Janus Capital Mgmt. LLC, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n 1-2 (Feb. 28, 2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-90.pdf.
127 Id.
"' Id. at 2.
129 Letter from Robert W. Uek, Chair, Indep. Dirs. Council, to Nancy M. Morris,
Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 4 (Feb. 15, 2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-
07/s72807-51.pdf. In addition, without a precise limit, summary sections may
drastically vary from fund to fund, thus hindering investors' ability to compare
between funds. See Letter from Josiah Fisk, Co-Founder and Director, Firehouse
Fin. Commc'ns LLC, to NancyMorris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 3 (Feb. 29,
2008) http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-121.pdf.
130 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4551.
131 Letter from Eric D. Roiter, Senior Vice President and Gen. Counsel, Fidelity
Mgmt. & Research Co., to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 5 (Feb.
28, 2008) http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-105.pdf. Fidelity's comment letter
suggested that "[t]he 'fund by fund' format in a summary prospectus, which
precludes the grouping or consolidation of information for closely related funds,
would in some cases impede, rather than promote, clear and concise disclosure to
investors." Id. For example, Roiter, Fidelity's senior vice president and general
counsel believes that an investor evaluating Fidelity's twelve Freedom Funds may
prefer to view a summary of each fund in that product line rather than view twelve
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Premier VIP Trust, registered open-end investment companies,
suggested that the SEC's strict regulation of what material can
be included in the summary prospectus is not practical for every
mutual fund.1"2 The SEC took note of these suggestions and
modified its original proposal to allow funds that are used as
investment vehicles in retirement plans and variable insurance
contracts to modify or eliminate particular items from the
summary prospectus.133 For example, these funds may modify or
omit specific information pertaining to the purchase and sale of
fund shares that is not relevant.
134
Commentators were also critical of moving cost information
to a more prominent position in the summary prospectus because
they believed it placed too great an emphasis on fees and costs.
One critic argued that while cost is an important factor, it is
not one of the most important factors, and thus should not be
given such a prominent location in the summary prospectus.135
Conversely, others believe that mutual funds are frequently sold
primarily based on favorable past performance, with investors
paying too little attention to a fund's fees and costs. 3' Many
mutual funds, and the broker-dealers who sell funds to
individual investors, inadequately inform investors about the
significance of costs when purchasing mutual funds. When
fees are not given the attention they require, investors tend
to fervently chase past results while glossing over cost
information. 137
separate summary prospectuses. Id. Therefore, Roiter requested that the SEC
"modify the proposed rule to provide an exception to permit life cycle and target risk
funds to integrate the presentation of summaries for multiple funds." Id.
12 Letter from Steven M. Joenk, Chair, Chief Executive Officer and President,
EQ Advisors Trust, AXA Premier VIP Trust, to Nancy Morris, Secretary, Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n 2 (Feb. 28, 2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-102.pdf
("[W]e believe that the Amendments, as currently proposed, do not contemplate
basic disclosures for funds that... serve as investment vehicles of variable life
insurance contracts and/or variable annuity certificates ... .
133 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4551.
134 Id.
1 Zimmer, supra note 125.
'3 Black, supra note 12, at 326.
137 See id.; Securities and Exchange Commission, Mutual Fund Investing: Look
at More than a Fund's Past Performance, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/
mfperform.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2010) (providing an example of the vast
difference in returns between annual operating expenses of 1.5% and 0.5% over an
investment period of twenty years).
14492009]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
One final area that garnered significant criticism concerned
the legend informing investors of the location of the statutory
prospectus; it was suggested that the legend be more
prominently situated. 3 ' Moreover, after viewing the sample
summary prospectus, it was also suggested that the legend
should appear in larger type font and printed in boldface,
stressing its importance to investors. 139  The legend should
include language that makes it clear to investors that the
summary prospectus does not contain all of the information one
should consider when making an investment decision. 14  The
SEC decided not to modify the legend and believes "that the
legend, as adopted, is sufficient to alert investors to the existence
and location of additional information about the fund. 14'
C. SEC's New Prospectus Delivery Requirements: A Layered
Approach to Disclosure
In addition to modifying the format and content of
the prospectus, the rule modifies the prospectus delivery
requirements. The rule replaced rule 498141 of the Securities Act
and allows mutual fund companies to satisfy their prospectus
delivery obligations under the Securities Act by sending or giving
investors a summary prospectus and providing the statutory
prospectus online. 14' The SEC does not intend the summary
prospectus to be "a self-contained document, but rather one
element in a layered disclosure regime that is intended to provide
investors with better, more useable access to the information in
the statutory prospectus, SAI, and shareholder reports than they
have today.'1 44 The rule permits mutual funds to satisfy their
obligation under section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act' 45 to deliver
a statutory prospectus in an offering registered on Form N-1A by
18 Gross & Yamamoto, supra note 121, at 3.
139 Id.
140 Id. ("Due to the easy-to-follow format of the Summary Prospectus, investors
may overestimate their knowledge of investment matters and prematurely make
investment decisions.").
141 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4564.
142 17 C.F.R. § 230.498 (2008) (valid through March 31, 2009).
14 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4560; 17 C.F.R. § 230.498 (2009).
144 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4572.
141 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2006). Section 5(b)(2) makes it unlawful "to carry or
cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any such security for
the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a
prospectus." Id.
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sending or giving the summary prospectus to an investor no later
than the time of delivery of the security.146 If any other materials
accompany the summary prospectus when it is given to the
investor, the fund must ensure that the summary prospectus is
given "greater prominence. "147 For example, the summary
prospectus must be placed on top of a stack of paper documents
when provided to an investor. 148  The summary prospectus,
however, is not required to be given more prominence than
accompanying summary or statutory prospectuses.
149
In its original proposal, the SEC made the "greater
prominence" standard a condition to satisfaction of delivery
obligations under section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act.15° After
further consideration, the SEC chose to make it a rule
requirement only; thus, failing to comply with the rule will
not result in as serious a violation as failing to meet the
requirements of section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act.151 The SEC
did, however, adopt the "greater prominence" requirement that
prohibits the "Summary Prospectus from being bound together
with any other materials. 15 2 Though commentators were split on
this element, the SEC "continue[s] to believe that it is important
to prevent the Summary Prospectus from being obscured by
accompanying sales and other materials and to highlight for
investors the concise, balanced presentation of the Summary
Prospectus.'"153
The SEC has also established specific delivery guidelines to
allow mutual funds to take advantage of technology and the
Internet. Under the rule, a "fund's current summary prospectus,
statutory prospectus, SAI, and most recent annual reports must
146 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4561.
147 Id. at 4562.
148 Id.
149 Id.
150) Id.
1 Id. The SEC stated:
While we continue to believe that the 'greater prominence' requirement is
important to prevent the Summary Prospectus from being obscured by
accompanying sales and other materials ... we are persuaded by
commenters that the consequences of failure to meet the condition-a
Section 5 violation-is not needed to achieve our goal.
Id.
152 Id.
13 Id. at 4562-63. The only instance where the SEC will allow the binding of a
summary prospectus with other materials is in the case of a variable annuity or
variable life insurance contract. Id. at 4563.
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be provided, free of charge, at the Web site address specified on
the cover or at the beginning of the summary prospectus.' 54
These documents must be accessible prior to or at the time the
summary prospectus is provided to the investor, and current
versions of these documents must remain on funds' websites for
at least ninety days after the date that the mutual fund security
is delivered. 15 5 These documents must "be presented in a format
that is human-readable and capable of being printed on paper in
human-readable format."' 6  The SEC did not, however, make
the formatting requirement a condition to satisfying delivery
obligations under section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act. ' In other
words, a fund that fails to comply with the requirement that the
statutory prospectus be presented in a format that is "convenient
for both reading online and printing on paper" will face a
violation of the SEC's rule but will not be deemed to have
violated section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act. 58
The rule also contains requirements for linking back and
forth among the summary prospectus, statutory prospectus, and
the SAI on a fund's website. 50 Investors accessing the statutory
prospectus or SAI online must "be able to move directly back and
forth between each section heading in a table of contents of the
document and the section of the document referenced in that
section heading.''16 0 Moreover, investors accessing the summary
prospectus online must be able to navigate back and forth
between related sections of the statutory prospectus and SAI that
"' Id. at 4566.
155 Id.
151 Id. The rule as proposed would have required the documents to be "presented
in a format that is convenient for both reading online and printing on paper" as a
condition to complying with relevant securities regulations. Id. In response to
commentators' suggestions, the SEC has modified this portion of the rule. Id.
However, the SEC decided not to specify a particular format such as HTML or PDF
as constituting a convenient format. Id. at 4567. The SEC states that it is "concerned
that the Commission's endorsement of any particular format could result in the use
of that format to the exclusion of other formats that are in existence today or that
may be developed in the future and that are more user-friendly." Id.
17 Id. at 4566-67. It is also not a condition to satisfying section 2(a)(10) of the
Securities Act. Id.
1 Id. at 4566. A cause of action under section 5(b)(2) of the Securities Act may
provide a purchaser of securities with remedies of rescission or damages. See
Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, What Constitutes Violation of § 5(b)(2) of Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A. § 77e(b)(2)), Requiring Security To Be Accompanied or
Preceded by Prospectus, 28 A.L.R. FED. 811, § 2(b) (1976).
"' Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4567.
160 Id.
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provide additional information concerning items mentioned in
the summary prospectus. 16 1 The purpose of these requirements is
to provide investors with online information in a "more useable
format than the same information when provided in paper"-
enhancing its overall goal of more accessible disclosure.
162
The SEC has recognized that due to system outages or other
technological problems, a fund may temporarily not be in
compliance with the rule's Internet posting requirements.
1 63
Therefore, it has included a "safe harbor" provision that will
protect mutual funds from liability provided they have
"reasonable procedures in place to ensure that those materials
are available in the required manner. '164 In addition, a fund is
required to take prompt action to ensure that the materials are
available "as soon as practicable following the earlier of the time
at which the fund knows or reasonably should have known that
the documents are not available in the manner required." '165
Finally, the new rule permits the summary prospectus to
incorporate by reference additional information contained in a
fund's statutory prospectus, SAI, and shareholder reports. 16 6 A
fund, however, may not incorporate by reference information
from any other source. 167  Additionally, a fund may not
incorporate by reference any of the information that is required
to be provided in the summary prospectus. 16 The SEC believes
that permitting funds to incorporate by reference information
contained in these lengthier disclosure documents-the statutory
prospectus, SAI, and shareholder reports-"further[s] [its] goal of
creating an improved mutual fund disclosure framework for the
benefit of investors. '16 9 The SEC is confident that by allowing
funds to take advantage of incorporation by reference, a
significant number of funds and intermediaries will be more
161 See id. at 4567-68.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 4569.
64 Id. The SEC did not elaborate on what would constitute "reasonable
procedures."
165 Id.
161 Id. If a fund chooses to incorporate information by reference, the summary
prospectus must specify, in the legend, what type of document is being referenced-
for example, the statutory prospectus-and the date of the document must be
provided. Id. at 4570.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
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likely to utilize the summary prospectus. 17°  According to the
SEC, permitting incorporation by reference furthers its goals of
encouraging mutual funds to use the summary prospectus and
providing investors with a user-friendly approach to disclosure.
171
It is, however, contestable whether permitting incorporation
by reference truly benefits the investor or whether it simply
alleviates mutual funds' concerns over liability. The SEC's
current approach to incorporation by reference in the summary
prospectus goes too far. Allowing mutual fund companies to
incorporate information from multiple documents is confusing for
investors and its use should be severely limited. 72
D. Critique of the Newly Adopted Delivery Requirements
The new delivery requirements and the layered approach to
disclosure received a great deal of attention from commentators
during the proposal stage. Commentators expressed concerns
with the leniency of the "greater prominence" requirement. One
commentator suggested that the SEC should take greater steps
to prevent this "lightweight" summary prospectus, which
contains crucial information, from being lost among marketing
materials that have more lenient standards than those contained
in rule 10(b)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.113 During
the comment period, it was suggested that the SEC incorporate a
legend in the summary prospectus that reads, "Promotional
Materials: Except [for] the above documents, the Fund may send
you additional materials promotional in nature. The law permits
more freedom in preparing them. The promotional materials
'7" Id. at 4571. The SEC credits the low usage rates of the late nineties' fund
profile-discussed above-to concerns about possible liability for omission of facts
from the profile that were contained in the statutory prospectus or SAI. Id.; see also
Certner, supra note 71, at 2 (stating that liability concerns relating to the use of the
fund profile contributed to its lack of use among mutual funds); Letter from Joseph
A. Franco, Professor, Suffolk Univ. Law Sch., to Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 6 (Feb. 28,
2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-113.pdf (stating that the fund profile
was "overly restrictive" in terms of what it permitted to be incorporated by reference,
contributing to its limited use).
1.1 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4570-71.
172 One commentator suggested that the SEC modify the rule only to allow
incorporation by reference to the statutory prospectus. See Franco, supra note 170,
at 6.
' 3 See Letter from Bo Li, Esq., to Nancy. M. Morris, Secretary, Sec. &
Exch. Comm'n (Feb. 28, 2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-110.pdf:
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
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may be less reliable."17 4  It was argued that this additional
warning combined with the requirement that the summary
prospectus be the first document sent to investors, would ensure
that investors give the summary prospectus the attention it
deserves.175
Commentators also expressed concern over the role of the
Internet in the rule's disclosure and delivery regime. For
example, AARP cautioned the SEC to be careful in its reliance on
the Internet in conjunction with the expectation
that investors will proactively seek out a fund's statutory
prospectus.176 Thus, AARP strongly encouraged the SEC to
require that investors receive timely access to a hard copy of
the summary prospectus and to make certain that "access
does not equal delivery," as some commentators proposed.'77
Research conducted by AARP revealed older investors' strong
preference to receive information regarding their investments via
regular mail rather than by electronic delivery. 78 Thus, the SEC
maintained the requirement that mutual funds send or give
investors a hard copy of the summary prospectus while providing
the additional disclosure documents online. 7 9
174 Li, supra note 173.
17 See id.
171 See Certner, supra note 71, at 3.
177 Letter from David Certner, Legislative Counsel and Director of Legislative
Policy, AARP, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 1-2 (June 16,
2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-140.pdf (supplementing AARP's Feb.
28, 2008 letter). AARP cautioned against some commentators' suggestion that the
SEC include an "access equals delivery" provision for the summary prospectus,
eliminating the requirement to send a hard copy except when requested by an
investor. Id.
17 Id. When asked how they prefer to receive investment-related information,
eighty-one percent of respondents aged fifty to sixty-nine expressed a preference for
regular mail. ELIZABETH WILLIS & S. KATHI BROWN, STRATEGIC ISSUES RESEARCH,
AARP, VIEWS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR TOWARD INTERNET-BASED DELIVERY OF
COMPANY PROXY MATERIALS 28 (2006), available at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/
generat/investor-proxy.pdf. Another study funded by the NASD Investor Education
Foundation that examined fund purchase practices found that a majority of
respondents aged sixty-five and older said they would not use the Internet to
conduct research related to investments. BARBARA ROPER & STEPHEN BROBECK,
CONSUMER FEDERAL OF AMERICA, MUTUAL FUND PURCHASE PRACTICES: AN
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 3, http://www.consumerfed.org/ pdfs/mutual fund-
survey-report.pdf.
179 Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4560. AARP believes that
"requiring investors to take steps to obtain a summary prospectus would likely
dampen access to the key information contained in it." Certner, supra note 177.
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Additionally, commentators disagreed as to whether
providing investors with a summary prospectus while telling
them that more information is available online was the most
effective way to improve disclosure. For example, one
commentator stated that this method might lead investors to
conclude that the summary prospectus is the only thing they
need to review before making an investment decision.180 To solve
this problem, this commentator suggested that investors should
only receive notice that information is available on the fund's
website and nothing more; this radical approach would avoid the
risk of liability that the summary prospectus will inevitably
create due to its minimalist approach to dispensing
information.8 "No matter what rules the Commission adopts,
plaintiffs will always contend that the mutual fund misled
investors by hiding 'key' information in the statutory prospectus
rather than including it in the summary prospectus that was
actually delivered to the investor." ' 2 This commentator argued
that the SEC should rely on the market to transform investor
information into user-friendly formats-a "survival of the fittest"
type of approach. 183 He stated, "[tihere is no reason to suppose
that the market is any less efficient in disseminating information
about mutual funds" than it is in disseminating information
about other types of investments.18 4
Finally the majority of mutual fund companies that
responded to the SEC's request for comments suggested that the
SEC do away with the proposed back-and-forth linking
requirement between documents on a fund's website. These
companies suggested that the cost of complying with the proposal
is enormous and may force some funds to completely rebuild
their website infrastructure. 18  For example, representatives
from Janus estimated that the redesigning of its website in order
to comply with the proposed amendments would be its largest
expenditure in complying with the proposal.18 Oppenheimer
Funds's general counsel agreed and suggested that the SEC do
"I Letter from Stephen A. Keen, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n 3-4 (Feb. 28, 2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-106.pdf.
'8' Id. at 3.
182 Id. at 4.
See id. at 3.
184 Id.
5 Grauerholz -Lofton, supra note 126.
186 Id.
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away with the back-and-forth linking requirement due to the
significant resources and enormous cost this complex
undertaking would require. 1 7 Although the SEC retained the
back-and-forth linking requirements between the summary
prospectus and the statutory prospectus in its final rule, it
modified the proposal in order to offer more flexibility for
funds."' 8 The SEC reduced the number of links that would be
necessary to link between the summary prospectus and the
tables of contents of the statutory prospectus and SAI by
"requir[ing] either links located at both the beginning and end of
the Summary Prospectus, or links that remain continuously
visible to persons accessing the Summary Prospectus, perhaps in
a separate panel or frame." 9 Though the SEC has reduced the
number of links available in these documents, the requirement
that they "remain continuously visible" ensures that they will be
readily accessible to investors, promoting the SEC's overall goal
of effective disclosure. 9 °
III. WILL INVESTORS BE BETTER OFF WITH THE SEC'S NEW RULE?
While the SEC's initiative has improved upon the current
disclosure regime, many areas of the new rule could use further
refinement and development. The summary prospectus is
admittedly an improvement over the statutory prospectus, but
the SEC has fallen short of its ultimate goal of revolutionizing
... Letter from Robert G. Zack, Executive Vice President and Gen. Counsel,
Oppenheimer Funds, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 12-13
(Feb. 28, 2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-120.pdf.
... See Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4567-68. The modifications
include a clarification that the linking between the table of contents of the statutory
prospectus and the summary prospectus "may be outside the document, e.g., in
a separate frame or panel of the computer screen and need not be the table of
contents that is contained within the document itself." Id. at 4567. The SEC stated,
"[t]his modification is intended to provide flexibility to use linking technologies other
than hyperlinking within the document itself. Permitted technologies would
include . . . the use of 'bookmarks' that replicate the document's table of contents,
but are displayed in a separate panel from the document itself." Id. In addition, the
SEC provided additional clarification in the final rule by stating that "the links must
permit movement directly back and forth between each section heading in a table of
contents and the particular section of the document referenced in that section
heading." Id.
"' Id. at 4568.
190 Id. This alteration responds to commentators' concerns that too many links
would result in a confusing and cluttered presentation of the summary prospectus.
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disclosure. The tension fueled by the statutory prospectus's role
as both an informative document and one that shields funds from
liability must be taken into account when examining the
intended function of the new summary prospectus. Requiring
mutual funds to continue to produce a statutory prospectus does
not relieve this tension that has bogged down the disclosure
environment for so long. Given the proposed execution of
the summary prospectus and the corresponding delivery
requirements, the rule sends a mixed message to investors
regarding whether or not they can rely solely on the summary
prospectus when making an investment decision. In addition,
the delivery option places an unnecessary, added burden on
investors.
It is doubtful that the SEC's new rule alone will foster the
degree of change needed to heighten investor confidence and
protection. A more beneficial approach would include
streamlining the statutory prospectus into one user-friendly
document that expands upon the summary prospectus so that an
investor need not seek out additional information. In addition to
streamlining disclosure, substantive regulations that directly
govern mutual fund advisers' conduct are needed to heighten
investor protection.
A. Critical Examination of the Summary Prospectus and the
Underlying Policy Concerns
The SEC's rule is based on certain presumptions that
demand closer scrutiny. Generally, the summary prospectus is a
significant improvement over the current statutory prospectus.
If read and understood by investors, the summary prospectus has
the potential to provide them with a helpful starting point.
However, there are particular areas that need further
modification to meaningfully enhance protection for investors.
These areas include, and are not limited to, providing stricter
guidelines concerning the formatting of the summary prospectus;
imposing a bright-line rule to ensure that marketing materials
are not confused with the summary prospectus; and enhancing
the legend informing investors that the summary prospectus, as
currently adopted, does not contain all pertinent information
concerning the particular fund.
1458 [Vol. 83:1431
ENHANCED DISCLOSURE
"In order for a disclosure system to be effective, not only
must the information ... be disclosed completely, clearly, and
accurately, but it must also be read and comprehended by the
consumer."'1 91 The current disclosure regime is overly complex
and ineffective yet "[s]ecurities regulation is motivated by the
assumption that more information is better than less."'92  The
philosophy behind the new rule-improving disclosure by
providing investors with a streamlined disclosure piece-appears
to take aim at this critique; yet merely adding another layer of
disclosure is not the proper solution. Investors should either be
able to rely on the summary prospectus to make an investment
decision or the length of the statutory prospectus should be
significantly reduced so that it is the only disclosure document
provided to investors. Parceling the disclosure process into a
series of "layers" does not meaningfully streamline disclosure; in
fact, it arguably generates confusion on the part of investors who
do not know what information to rely on when making an
investment decision.
With regard to the content and organization of the
prospectus, the SEC should mandate a standardized format for
all funds that specifies font type, font size, and use of color and
graphics. Strict formatting guidelines should be developed to
ensure that the summary prospectus is not easily confused with
marketing materials. Some critics are concerned that a short
summary may make it difficult for investors to tell the difference
between a marketing pitch and SEC-mandated disclosure.' 9'
This concern cannot be alleviated until more stringent formatting
regulations are adopted. Just as there should be strict guidelines
regulating the formatting of these documents, the SEC should
specify a particular format for the online posting of the
documents, such as PDF. Allowing too much discretion in this
area will result in presentations that vary significantly from fund
to fund, thus inhibiting investors' ability to compare and contrast
funds effectively.
The SEC properly disposed of the proposed top ten holdings
requirement, as it was not a meaningful addition to the
prospectus. As one critic pointed out, it is merely a snapshot of
191 Ripken, supra note 68, at 146.
192 Id. at 147.
19 Anand, supra note 18.
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the portfolio on a given day.194 The SEC also decided not to
incorporate the quarterly updating performance requirement in
its final rule. It mandates, however, that funds that supply this
information elsewhere must indicate-in the summary section-
where it can be found.19 Requiring funds to inform investors
where they can locate performance information is a valid
compromise especially given concerns over investors' tendency
to chase past returns when making investment decisions.
Moreover, it is equally important for investors to understand the
costs associated with investing in a particular fund. The SEC
justifiably moved cost information to a more prominent position.
Considering the significance investors place on past performance,
anything the SEC can do to educate investors about fees and how
they impact returns is advantageous.
The "layered approach" to delivery consists of a fund sending
investors the summary prospectus while providing the statutory
prospectus online. If funds choose to satisfy their delivery
obligations in this manner, they are providing investors with
simply one more document that may be ignored. Considering
that investors are also receiving marketing materials from
multiple funds, how are they to know that the summary
prospectus is of greater importance? The SEC's "greater
prominence" rule does not provide an adequate solution to this
dilemma. To solve this problem and the possible confusion with
marketing materials, the SEC should impose a bright-line rule
ensuring that no other materials will accompany the summary
prospectus. The SEC should then set up a time frame for when
mutual fund companies may begin sending investors marketing
materials. Marketing materials usually precede the prospectus,
which is typically not sent to an investor until confirmation of an
initial purchase.196 If the summary prospectus were to become
the first document received by an investor, there would be less
confusion as to its importance. It is vital that marketing
materials, which typically gloss over important items like fees
and risk, do not overshadow the summary prospectus.
While it has made some improvements in the area of fund
disclosure by streamlining preliminary disclosure documents, the
SEC is sending a mixed message to investors with its layered
'4 See Joenk, supra note 132, at 3.
' Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4566.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (2006).
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approach to disclosure. Authorizing the use of a summary
prospectus that theoretically contains everything an investor
needs to know while stamping a disclosure on it telling an
investor that he may want to read the statutory prospectus
before investing, sends a conflicting message. The SEC stated
that it does not "intend the Summary Prospectus to be a self-
contained document, but rather one element in a layered
disclosure regime that results in the simultaneous provision of
information to investors through multiple means." '97  It is
unrealistic to expect investors to take the additional step of
reviewing the statutory prospectus-a document that is
inherently difficult to understand-before making an investment
decision. In fact, a study conducted by the Investment Company
Institute found that only thirty-four percent of investors polled
said that they looked at a fund's prospectus before investing.19" If
most investors are not currently reading statutory prospectuses
when they receive hard copies, it is impractical to expect
investors to read them when the SEC's new rule is implemented.
Compounding the problem is that the legend in its current
form 99 does not adequately encourage investors to seek out the
statutory prospectus. If the SEC believes that the statutory
prospectus is still a vital tool for investors, the language used in
the legend should be far more compelling.
Finally, the rule will burden investors who bring suit against
brokers for fraud or misrepresentation. In a jurisdiction such as
New York where courts apply the "Prospectus Rule"-which
provides that "a written prospectus bars most claims against
conflicting oral misstatements"-the brokerage industry has a
distinct advantage over investors. 00 Investors are charged with
constructive knowledge of the information contained in a fund's
statutory prospectus regardless of whether they read it or
understood it. Rather than reading the prospectus, some
investors choose to rely on their brokers' oral statements. But
ultimately the onus is on the investor in the event of a financial
'9' Proposal, supra note 75, at 67,805.
'9" INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, UNDERSTANDING INVESTOR PREFERENCES
FOR MUTUAL FUND INFORMATION 4 (2006), available at http://ici.org/pdf/rpt-06-
inv-prefs-full.pdf.
... See supra note 100.
... Kenneth B. Gorton, When Words Collide: Arbitrating Securities Claims When
Oral Misrepresentations by a Broker Contradict a Written Prospectus. PIABA B.J. 24,
25 (Spring 2006).
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adviser's misstatement." 1  This is a troubling realization
considering professional advisers are the most common source of
information sought out by mutual fund investors.2" ' Therefore, it
is critical that the system of disclosure encourages readership of
prospectus materials while providing investors with a heightened
level of protection.
Compare the standard in New York and the Second Circuit
with California's more lenient federal case-law standard, which
holds that an investor's receipt of a prospectus does not
constitute constructive knowledge for common law fraud and
other related actions.0 3  Given the increased responsibility
investors will have in obtaining information under the new rule,
it would certainly be fairer to investors if the New York courts
moved in the direction of California's system. This concern
20 See Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1993)
("An investor may not justifiably rely on a [broker's] misrepresentation if, through
minimal diligence, the investor should have discovered the truth."), superseded by
statute, Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109
Stat. 737; see also Marlow v. Gold, No. 89 Civ. 8589, 1991 WL 107268, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. June 13, 1991) (holding that an investor recklessly disregarded written
warnings when he relied on assurances from his accountant); Treacy v. Simmons,
No. 89 Civ. 7052, 1991 WL 67474, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 1991) (finding that it was
unreasonable for an investor to rely on broker's oral statements in lieu of reading
the risks disclosed in the prospectus). The state courts in New York have applied the
prospectus rule with even more force than the federal courts. Gorton, supra note
200, at 16; see Yang v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (In re Dean Witter Managed
Futures Ltd. P'ship Litig.), 282 A.D.2d 271, 271, 724 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (1st Dep't
2001) ("[Plaintiffs'] causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation are
barred by the prospectuses .... Such disclosures in the written offering materials
rendered any reliance on alleged contradictory oral representations unjustifiable as
a matter of law .... (citations omitted)).
202 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 198, at 4.
2011 See Casella v. Webb, 883 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the
district court erred in granting summary judgment "against the [plaintiffs] on the
ground they had constructive notice the alleged misrepresentations were not true");
Luksch v. Latham, 675 F. Supp. 1198, 1199 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (concluding that
"knowledge of the information contained in offering memoranda ... should not be
legally imputed to investors"); Acebey v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., No. CV 92-
5926-WMB, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19659, at *37 n.17 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 1993)
(interpreting Luksch as "requir[ing] proof that each investor charged with
constructive notice of his claims had read the prospectus and appreciated the
importance of the fact that the prospectus contradicted other representations that
defendants had made"), affd, 62 F.3d 1423 (9th Cir. 1995).
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becomes even more paramount in light of the possibility that
mutual funds may bury less appealing information in the
statutory prospectus. °4
It is unlikely, however, that the New York courts will
discontinue their application of the "Prospectus Rule" given the
way in which the SEC has presented the summary prospectus.
Because the SEC has presented it as a preliminary disclosure
document complete with a disclaimer encouraging investors to
seek out the statutory prospectus before investing, the courts will
likely continue to place the burden on investors to seek out
additional information in the face of conflicting statements by a
broker.2 °5 It is also unreasonable for investors to be charged with
constructive notice of what is contained in the statutory
prospectus. This is especially inequitable for investors when a
fund can satisfy its delivery obligations by simply sending a
summary prospectus to the investor while posting the statutory
prospectus online. The new delivery option places too high
a burden on consumers given that it will be consumers'
responsibility to locate the statutory prospectus on the fund's
website or take the initiative to call the fund and request one.
This "burden-shifting" policy does not coincide with the purpose
of either the Securities Act or the 1940 Act, which were enacted
to eliminate the caveat emptor component of investing."'
Another way in which the burden may be shifted back onto
the consumer is in the form of fees. "Distribution or Service
Fees"-commonly referred to as "12b-1 fees"-are fees paid by
the fund out of its assets to pay for the costs of marketing and
selling fund shares to consumers." 7 Distribution fees pay for
204 This worry is enhanced given the fact that instead of two layers of
disclosure-comprised of the statutory prospectus and the SAI-there will now be
three layers, with the summary prospectus comprising the first.
20. See Dodds v. Cigna Sec., Inc., 12 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that "a
plaintiff [cannot] rely on misleading oral statements to establish an unsuitability
claim when the offering materials contradict the oral assurances"). The court in
Dodds also held that issuers of prospectuses cannot be expected to predict "the risk
averseness of each potential investor." Id.; see also Addeo v. Braver, 956 F. Supp.
443, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding in an action for fraud, that plaintiffs had "a duty
to inquire into the reliability of defendant's investment advice." If plaintiffs were
unsuccessful in doing so, "they must be held to [have] had constructive knowledge
not merely of those facts directly implicated on the face of the materials available to
them, but also of any information that would have come to light during the course of
a reasonable investigation").
206 See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
207 Invest Wisely, supra note 23.
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compensating those who sell shares of the fund and for the
printing and mailing of prospectuses and sales literature. 208 The
SEC does not address whether investors will be effectually
"footing the bill" for its newly adopted rule in the form of
increased 12b-1 fees. If investors will be paying for the rule's
implementation, they should be given a greater say in how this
information is presented and delivered." 9
B. Is Disclosure Enough?
Given how complicated the current disclosure regime is, one
must inquire whether disclosure alone provides investors
with adequate protection. The academic community has
painted a dismal picture of average investors, describing them
as "generally uninformed and financially unsophisticated. '21
Empirical studies of investor behavior show that investors suffer
from cognitive biases that mask their ability to make rational
investment decisions.211 Such cognitive biases include chasing
past returns and the "home bias," or the tendency to buy
domestic assets while underweighting foreign assets.212 Still
other academic studies have revealed investors' lack of
understanding of risk and their apparent indifference to it.
13
Some argue, "until the [SEC] faces the cognitive biases and
investment limitations that most fund investors face, further
streamlining of fund disclosures is unlikely to help."1 4
208 Id.
209 For a detailed estimate of the costs associated with the SEC's proposal,
review Enhanced Disclosure Rule, supra note 5, at 4580-81.
210 Palmiter & Taha, supra note 37, at 936.
211 See id. at 938-39; see also Ripken, supra note 68, at 158-60.
112 See Palmiter & Taha, supra note 37, at 994, 1002. Other biases include the
"overconfidence bias," which "facilitates an enhanced sense of ability to control
events and risks;" the "optimism bias," which leads people to "believe that they
are far more likely than others to experience positive life outcomes;" and the
"confirmation bias," which may lead investors to "look for information that affirms,
rather than undermines, their beliefs, and they may be slow to change their beliefs
in the face of new evidence," such as poor returns. Ripken, supra note 68, at 163-76.
21 Palmiter & Taha, supra note 37, at 978.
214 Letter from Alan Palmiter and Ahmed Taha, Professors of Law, Wake Forest
Univ. Sch. of Law, to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n (Mar. 4,
2008), http://sec.gov/comments/s7-28-07/s72807-125.pdf.
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"The SEC's belief that fund investors can fend for
themselves, once armed with adequate disclosure, fails to
appreciate the extent of investors' limitations. '215  Perhaps the
problem originated with the passage of the 1940 Act, as
illustrated by the following passage:
The Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "1940 Act"), passed
by Congress to regulate the disclosure and management of
mutual funds, assumes that mutual fund investors cannot
adequately fend for themselves. Nonetheless, despite doubts
about the capabilities of fund investors, the 1940 Act also
assumes (somewhat inconsistently) that fund investors can
make basic asset-allocation and fund-selection decisions. The
1940 Act thus adopts a blurred policy between regulatory
paternalism and market liberalism, with a significant portion of
industry oversight left not to regulation but to fund investors
themselves.216
This "blurred policy" of protecting investors, on the one
hand, while allowing them to fend for themselves, on the other,
is prevalent in our current disclosure system. We cannot
assume that by providing investors with multiple disclosure
documents, they will automatically be transformed into savvy
decisionmakers.
Perhaps improving disclosure, without more, is not
enough.217 Instead, rules that regulate the conduct of investment
companies more directly and substantively may be more effective
than attempts to streamline disclosure.218 It is, however, easy to
recognize why disclosure is such a popular means of regulation
for the government-it is "the least controversial way of trying to
get corporations to behave properly."219  Substantive legislation
that directly affects economic behavior rather than demanding
disclosure would be more effective in protecting investors
21 Palmiter & Taha, supra note 37, at 936.
216 Id. at 937.
217 Ripken, supra note 68, at 190.
218 Id.
21 Id. at 189; see also id. (stating that "[d]isclosure has always seemed to be the
most palatable form of regulation because it constitutes a compromise: requiring
disclosure is better than doing nothing at all, but it does not go so far as to regulate
substantive conduct directly.").
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and instilling consumer confidence in the capital markets. 220
Substantive regulation would command favorable corporate
conduct while prohibiting behavior that is improper or unfair.221
Substantive securities regulation that prohibits improper
behavior by corporations can be effective in stimulating investor
trust and promoting investor protection. 222 "Investors might not
trust in the corporate insiders themselves, but they rely on the
efficacy of strong regulation of the corporate insiders. 223  The
merits of substantive regulation require far more analysis and
thought, but the proposal provides an interesting take on
disclosure alternatives. 24  Rather than responding to every
corporate scandal that tests investor confidence by adding more
layers of disclosure, perhaps it is time to examine viable
alternatives .22
The SEC has responded with substantive regulation of
mutual funds in the past.22 '6 Trading abuses known as "market
timing, in which traders buy and sell fund shares based on
movements in stock prices that aren't yet reflected in the pricing
of those fund shares '"227 and "late trading," which occurs when
funds are bought and sold at closing price past the four p.m.
228deadline, were brought to light in 2003 by New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer and the SEC.229 In response, the SEC's
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations prepared a
220 Id. at 190.
221 Id. For example, rather than requiring companies to disclose certain "related-
party transactions," it makes more sense to prohibit these kinds of transactions
altogether. Id. at 192. The author uses the example of Regulation S-K, which
requires that directors of a corporation who have a material interest in transactions
with the corporation exceeding $60,000 must publicly disclose the nature of the
transaction and what their interest in that transaction is. Id. at 191.
22 Id. at 204.
221 Id. at 195.
224 Id. at 204.
225 Id.
226 See Memorandum from Lori A. Richards, Office of Compliance Inspections
and Examinations, See. & Exch. Comm'n, to Chairman William H. Donaldson,
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 2 (Mar. 10, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/extra/apx-
ts031004lar.pdf [hereinafter Inspection Memorandum].
227 Tom Lauricella, Deborah Solomon & Gregory Zuckerman, Mutual Funds
Face Overhaul as Spitzer and SEC Fight for Turf, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2003, at Al
(internal quotation marks omitted).
228 Arden Dale, Public Pension Funds React to Probe: Some States Have Fired
Investment Managers; Others Wait and Watch, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2003, at D9.
229 Deborah Solomon, SEC Plans Makeover of Trading Rules for Mutual Funds,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2003, at C1.
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report, which described the changes the SEC was instituting in
response to abusive market timing and late trading activities.23 °
These changes were premised on enhancements to the
examination procedures to address "market timing" and "late
trading." '231 The enhancements, which are becoming a mandatory
procedure in routine examinations, incorporate "review[s of]
trading in the fund's shares," "a daily summary of net sales
and redemptions," and the sampling of internal e-mail
correspondence.232 In addition, in December 2003, the SEC
adopted a rule requiring funds to implement and maintain
written compliance procedures designed to prevent violations like
the ones mentioned above from occurring.233
CONCLUSION
An approach that combines improved disclosure with
substantive securities regulation is the most effective way to
enhance investor confidence and protection. Instead of relying on
a system of layered disclosure, the SEC should implement one
disclosure document that investors may wholly rely upon when
making an investment decision. Understandably, it would not be
as lightweight as the summary prospectus, but placing limits on
its length and content will prevent the document from evolving
into today's burdensome statutory prospectus.
Investors will experience greater confidence in knowing that
they can adequately arm themselves with information contained
in one easy-to-understand document, without having to seek out
additional information in documents like the statutory
prospectus and the SAL. Enhancing investor confidence will also
be realized when investors observe the SEC placing greater
substantive regulations on mutual funds and corporate
executives. This combination approach would strengthen the
SEC's efforts to improve disclosure in a meaningful way rather
that merely approaching the problem with another layer of
disclosure-an approach that has not been successful thus far.
When examining the current state of mutual fund disclosure,
one thing is certain-the statutory prospectus in its current form
does not properly equip investors with the knowledge required to
230 Inspection Memorandum, supra note 226, at 2.
231 Id. at 9.
232 Id.
231 Id. at 13.
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make important financial planning decisions. The SEC should be
commended for taking the initiative to craft a more user-friendly
document that will aid investors in making these important
decisions. However, the newly adopted rule does not provide the
necessary framework to implement such a feat. In addition to
enhancing the value of the summary prospectus, the SEC should
consider available alternatives for improving investor confidence
and, ultimately, the overall health of the financial markets.
